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Reconsidering the Tax Treatment of Pensions 
and Annuities 
Jonathan Barry Forman* 
INTRODUCTION 
A number of recent proposals would curtail the current 
federal income tax benefits for annuities, pensions, and 
individual retirement accounts (IRAs). For example, in his 2014 
Federal Budget, President Barack Obama proposed an overall 
cap on the total amount that individuals could accumulate in 
their tax-favored retirement plans.1 More specifically, once an 
individual had accumulated enough to provide an annuity of 
$205,000 a year starting at age sixty-two (about $3.4 million in 
2013), the proposal would prohibit further contributions.2 
Similarly, in 2010, the National Commission on Fiscal 
Responsibility and Reform (co-chaired by Erskine Bowles and 
former Senator Alan Simpson) proposed an annual cap on 
retirement contributions.3 The proposal would cap the total 
employer and employee retirement plan contributions at the 
lesser of 20% of the employee’s compensation or $20,000.4 This 
Article considers the merits of these and other proposals to limit 
the tax benefits for annuities, pensions, and IRAs. 
Part I of this Article explains how the current tax system 
provides favorable tax treatment for annuities, pensions, and 
IRAs. Part II then discusses a number of proposals to curtail that 
 
 * Alfred P. Murrah Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma; B.A. 1973, 
Northwestern University; M.A. (Psychology) 1975, University of Iowa; J.D. 1978, 
University of Michigan; M.A. (Economics) 1983, George Washington University; Professor 
in Residence at the Internal Revenue Service Office of Chief Counsel, Washington, D.C. 
for the 2009–2010 academic year; Member of the Board of Trustees of the Oklahoma 
Public Employees Retirement System, 2003–2011. Copyright © 2014, Jonathan Barry 
Forman. 
 1 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S 
FISCAL YEAR 2014 REVENUE PROPOSALS 165–66 (2013), available at http://www.treasury. 
gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2014.pdf. 
 2 Id. 
 3 NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY & REFORM, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH 31 
fig. 7 (2010), available at http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/ 
files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf. 
 4 Id. 
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favorable tax treatment. Finally, Part III considers the important 
issues raised by those proposals. 
I. THE CURRENT FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM PROVIDES FAVORABLE TAX 
TREATMENT FOR ANNUITIES, PENSIONS, AND INDIVIDUAL 
RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS  
Under the current federal income tax system, investment 
income is generally subject to federal personal income tax rates 
of up to 39.6% in 2014;5 however, dividend income and capital 
gains are generally taxed at no more than a 20% rate.6 This Part 
explains how the current tax system also provides favorable tax 
treatment for annuities, pensions, and IRAs.7 
A.  Annuities 
An annuity is a financial instrument (e.g., an insurance 
contract) that converts a lump sum of money into a stream of 
income payable over a period of years, typically for life.8 
Pertinent here, annuities are often used to provide lifetime 
retirement income.9 For example, for a sixty-five-year-old man 
who purchased a $100,000 immediate, level-payment lifetime 
annuity, without inflation protection, as of January 1, 2014, the 
annual payout would be around $6864 or 6.86% of the annuity’s 
purchase price.10 Because women tend to live longer than men, 
the annual payout for a sixty-five-year-old woman who elected an 
immediate, level-payment lifetime annuity, as of January 1, 
2014, would be just $6408 or 6.41% of the annuity’s purchase 
price.11 
 
 5 I.R.C. § 1 (2012); Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537.  
 6 I.R.C. § 1(h). 
 7 There are tax advantages associated with many other investments. For example, 
home mortgage interest is generally deductible, and gains from the sale of a personal 
residence are often excludable. I.R.C. §§ 163(a), 121. Interest on state and local bonds is 
exempt from tax. I.R.C. § 103. Insurance proceeds payable by reason of the death of the 
insured are exempt from tax. I.R.C. § 101(a). Also, gains are not typically taxed until they 
are realized. I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(3), 1001(a). Moreover, if property is held until death, the basis 
in the property often “steps up” to its fair market value, which means that the 
appreciation is never taxed. I.R.C. § 1014(a). 
 8 See JOSEPH BANKMAN, DANIEL N. SHAVIRO & KIRK J. STARK, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 117 (16th ed. 2012). The person holding an annuity is called an annuitant. Id. 
 9 See, e.g., Farrell Dolan, Applying the 4-Box Strategy to Retirement Income 
Planning: Generating a Lifetime of Income, LIMRA’S MARKETFACTS Q., Fall 2009, at 84, 
88, available at http://pjwalkercommunications.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Market-
Facts.pdf; Darla Mercado, Making the Case for Annuities, INVESTMENTNEWS (Mar. 25, 
2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120325/REG/303259969&iss 
uedate=20120323&sid=RI0326. 
 10 Immediate Annuities Update, ANNUITY SHOPPER, Jan. 2014, at 9, 18 tbl.5, 
available at www.immediateannuities.com/pdfs/as/annuity-shopper-2014-01.pdf ($6864 = 
$572 × 12). 
 11 Id. ($6408 = $534 × 12). 
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The income tax system provides very favorable tax treatment 
of investments in annuities.12 Although the value of an annuity 
investment grows over time, no tax is imposed until annuity 
distributions commence. In short, there is no tax on the so-called 
“inside buildup” until the “annuity starting date.” Even then, the 
annuitant can exclude a fraction of each benefit payment from 
income. That fraction (the “exclusion ratio”) is based on the 
amount of premiums or other after-tax contributions made by the 
individual. The exclusion ratio enables the individual to recover 
her own after-tax contributions tax-free and to pay tax only on 
the remaining portion of benefits which represents income. 
This deferral of taxation until benefits are actually received 
is a very valuable tax benefit (i.e., compared to say, a regular 
bank account where the interest income is taxed on an annual 
basis13). For example, according to the Joint Committee on 
Taxation, the exclusion of investment income on annuity (and life 
insurance) contracts will result in a tax expenditure of more than 
$30 billion in Fiscal Year 2015 and more than $150 billion over 
five years.14 
B.  Pension Plans and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) 
The United States has a voluntary pension system, and 
employers have considerable choice about whether and how to 
provide pension benefits to their employees.15 However, when 
employers do provide pensions, those pensions are typically 
subject to regulation under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).16 
 
 12 See I.R.C. § 72. 
 13 I.R.C. § 61(a)(4). 
 14 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL 
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012–2017, at 35 tbl.1 (Comm. Print 2013), 
available at https://www.jct.gov/ publications.html?func=startdown&id=4503; see also 
infra Table 2. 
 15 See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman & George A. (Sandy) Mackenzie, The Cost of 
“Choice” in a Voluntary Pension System, N.Y.U. REV. EMP. BENEFITS & EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION, 2013, at 6-1, 6-3.  
 16 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 
864 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (Supp. III 1997) and in scattered 
sections of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.); see also STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, 112TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO THE TAX 
TREATMENT OF RETIREMENT SAVINGS 2 (Comm. Print 2012), available at 
https://www.jct.gov/ publications.html?func=startdown&id=4418 (“These plans afford 
employers flexibility in the design and structure of the retirement plans they adopt, 
subject to . . . [ERISA].”). 
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1. Retirement Savings are Tax-Favored 
Most retirement savings qualify for even more generous tax 
treatment than annuities. For example, employer contributions 
to a pension are not taxable to the employee;17 the pension fund’s 
earnings on those contributions are tax-exempt;18 and retirees 
pay tax only when they receive distributions of their pension 
benefits.19 Nevertheless, the employer is allowed a current 
deduction for its contributions (within limits).20 
More specifically, pension benefits may be fully taxable or 
partially taxable, depending on whether the employee made any 
after-tax contributions. For example, an employee’s pension 
benefits will be fully taxable if the employee’s employer 
contributed all of the cost for the pension without any of the cost 
being included in the employee’s taxable wages.21 
On the other hand, if an employee made after-tax 
contributions to a pension, she can exclude a fraction of each 
benefit payment from income.22 As with regular annuities, that 
fraction—the “exclusion ratio”—is based on the amount of 
premiums or other after-tax contributions made by the employee, 
and this approach enables the employee to recover her own 
after-tax contributions tax free and to pay tax only on the 
remaining portion of benefits which represents income.23 
Taxpayers who begin receiving annuity payments from a 
pension plan after November 18, 1996, generally use the 
Simplified Method to figure the tax-free part of the payments.24 
Under the Simplified Method, the Internal Revenue Code 
provides a table with a fixed number of anticipated payments 
that depends upon the annuitant’s age as of the annuity starting 
date. The taxpayer then divides the total cost over the applicable 
number of anticipated payments and excludes the amount so 
determined each year. For example, if the annuity is payable 
over the life of a single individual, the number of anticipated 
payments is determined as follows: 
 
 
 17 I.R.C. § 402.  
 18 I.R.C. § 501(a). 
 19 I.R.C. §§ 72, 402. See generally I.R.S. Publication No. 575 (Jan. 2, 2014), available 
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p575.pdf. 
 20 I.R.C. § 404.  
 21 I.R.S. Publication No. 575, supra note 19, at 11. Pension benefits would also be 
fully taxable if the participant has already received all of her previously taxed 
contributions tax free in previous years. Id. 
 22 I.R.C. §§ 72, 402. 
 23 See supra Part I.A. 
 24 I.R.S. Publication No. 575, supra note 19, at 11–15. 
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Age at annuity starting date Number of anticipated payments 
55 or under 360 
56–60 310 
61–65 260 
66–70 210 
71 or older 160 
 
If the annuity is payable over two lives, the number of 
anticipated payments is determined as follows: 
 
Combined ages at annuity 
starting date 
Number of anticipated payments 
110 or under 410 
111–120 360 
121–130 310 
131–140 260 
141 or older 210 
 
Also, since 2006, employers have been permitted to set up 
so-called “Roth 401(k) plans.”25 Contributions to these plans are 
not excludable, but neither the plan’s investment returns nor 
distributions are taxable. 
Favorable tax rules are also available for IRAs.26 Almost any 
worker can set up an IRA with a bank or other financial 
institution. In 2014, individuals without pension plans can 
contribute and deduct up to $5500 to a regular IRA, although 
individuals over age 50 can contribute and deduct another $1,000 
(for a total of up to $6500); and spouses can contribute and 
deduct similar amounts.27  
Since 1998, individuals have been permitted to set up Roth 
IRAs.28 Unlike regular IRAs, contributions to Roth IRAs are not 
deductible. Instead, withdrawals are tax free. Like regular IRAs, 
however, Roth IRA earnings are tax exempt. 
 
 25 I.R.C. § 402A; see infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 26 I.R.C. § 219; I.R.S. Publication No. 590 (Jan. 5, 2014), available at http://www.irs. 
gov/pub/irs-pdf/p590.pdf. 
 27 See I.R.S. News Release IR-2013-86 (Oct. 31, 2013), available at http://www.irs. 
gov/uac/IRS-Announces-2014-Pension-Plan-Limitations;-Taxpayers-May-Contribute-up-to 
-$17,500-to-their-401(k)-plans-in-2014. 
 28 I.R.C. § 408A. 
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Finally, since 2002, certain low- and moderate-income 
individuals have been able to claim a non-refundable tax credit of 
up to $1000 for certain qualified retirement savings 
contributions.29 The credit equals a percentage (50%, 20%, or 
10%) of up to $2000 of contributions.30 In effect, the credit acts 
like an employer match: the government matches a portion of the 
employee’s contributions. 
2. Types of Pension Plans 
Pension plans generally fall into two broad categories based 
on the nature of the benefits provided: defined benefit plans and 
defined contribution plans. 
a. Defined benefit plans 
In a defined benefit plan, an employer promises employees a 
specific benefit at retirement.31 For example, a plan might 
provide that a worker’s annual retirement benefit (B) is equal to 
2% times the number of years of service (yos) times final average 
compensation (fac) (B = 2% × yos × fac). Under this traditional, 
final-average-pay formula, a worker who retires after thirty 
years of service with final average compensation of $50,000 
would receive a pension of $30,000 a year for life ($30,000 = 2% × 
30 yos × $50,000 fac).32 While many defined benefit plans allow 
for lump sum distributions, the default benefit for defined benefit 
plans is a retirement income stream in the form of a lifetime 
annuity.33 
b. Defined contribution plans 
Under a typical defined contribution plan, the employer 
simply withholds a specified percentage of the worker’s 
compensation, which it contributes to an individual investment 
 
 29 I.R.C. § 25B. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Jonathan Barry Forman & Amy Nixon, Cash Balance Pension Plan Conversions, 
25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 379, 385 (2000). To provide that benefit, the employer typically 
makes payments into a trust fund, contributed funds grow with investment returns, and 
eventually the employer withdraws funds from the trust fund to pay the promised 
benefits. Id. Employer contributions are based on actuarial valuations, and the employer 
bears all of the investment risks and responsibilities. Id. at 385–86. 
 32 Id. at 386. Final average compensation is often computed by averaging the 
worker’s salary over the last three or five years prior to retirement. Id. Alternatively, 
some plans use career-average compensation instead of final-average compensation. 
Under a career earnings formula, benefits are based on a percentage of an average of 
career earnings for every year of service by the employee. Id. 
 33 In the United States, defined benefit plans are generally designed to provide 
annuities, i.e., “definitely determinable benefits . . . over a period of years, usually for life, 
after retirement.” Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 2014).  
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account for the worker.34 For example, contributions might be set 
at 10% of annual compensation.35 Under such a plan, a worker 
who earned $50,000 in a given year would have $5000 
contributed to an individual investment account for her 
($5000 = 10% × $50,000).36 Her benefit at retirement would be 
based on all such contributions plus investment earnings.37 
Unlike traditional defined benefit plans, defined contribution 
plans usually make distributions in the form of lump-sum or 
periodic distributions rather than lifetime annuities. 
There are a variety of different types of defined contribution 
plans, including money purchase pension plans, profit-sharing 
plans, stock bonus plans, target benefit plans, and employee 
stock ownership plans (ESOPs).38 Profit-sharing and stock bonus 
plans often include a feature that allows workers to choose 
between receiving cash currently or deferring taxation by placing 
the money in a retirement account, according to Internal 
Revenue Code section 401(k). Consequently, these plans are often 
called “401(k) plans,” and they are the most popular type of 
retirement plan in the United States.39 The maximum annual 
amount of such elective deferrals that can be made by an 
individual in 2014 is $17,500, although workers over the age of 
50 can contribute another $5500 (for a total of up to $23,000).40 
Similar limits apply to Roth 401(k) plans.41 
c. Hybrid retirement plans 
So-called “hybrid” retirement plans mix the features of 
defined benefit and defined contribution plans.42 For example, a 
cash balance plan is a defined benefit plan that looks like a 
defined contribution plan.43 
 
 34 Forman & Nixon, supra note 31, at 386.  
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. Defined contribution plans are also known as “individual account” plans 
because each worker has her own account, as opposed to defined benefit plans, where the 
plan’s assets are pooled for the benefit of all of the employees. Id. 
 38 See, e.g., U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Six Ways to Save for Retirement, 
PROGRAM PERSP., Mar. 2011, at 1, 1–2, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/perspectives/ 
program_perspectives_vol3_issue3.pdf. 
 39 See, e.g., U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, BLS Examines Popular 401(k) 
Retirement Plans, PROGRAM PERSP., Nov. 2010, at 1, 1, available at http://www.bls.gov/ 
opub/perspectives/program_perspectives_vol2_issue6.pdf. 
 40 I.R.S. News Release IR-2013-86, supra note 27. 
 41 Id.; I.R.C. § 402A (2012). 
 42 Forman & Nixon, supra note 31, at 387.  
 43 Id. Like other defined benefit plans, employer contributions are based on actuarial 
valuations, and the employer bears all of the investment risks and responsibilities. Like 
defined contribution plans, however, cash balance plans provide workers with individual 
accounts (albeit hypothetical). Id. A simple cash balance plan might allocate 10% of salary 
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C.  The Economics of Tax Deferral 
The basic tax advantage of annuities, pension plans, and 
IRAs is tax deferral. For example, Table 1 shows the value of the 
tax advantages associated with saving in a regular pension plan 
(or IRA), as compared with saving in a regular savings account.44 
A regular savings account is funded with deposits that come from 
after-tax income and accumulate only at an annual after-tax 
interest rate—that is, the interest or investment income earned 
in such an account is taxed annually. The table assumes that a 
person age forty-five has $1000 in wages and wishes to save it for 
fifteen years for purposes of retirement at age sixty. The market 
interest rate during the full fifty years is assumed to be 8%. 
TABLE 1. TAX ADVANTAGES OF A $1000 CONTRIBUTION TO A 
REGULAR PENSION PLAN 
 
Example 1: Tax Rate of 
15% in Working Years 
Example 2: Tax Rate of 
40% in Working Years 
Regular 
Account 
Qualified 
Plan 
Regular 
Account 
Qualified 
Plan 
Contribution $1000 $1000 $1000 $1000 
Tax on contribution 150 ___ 400 ___ 
Deposit 850 1000 600 600 
Value at withdrawal 2280 3172 1212 3172 
Retirement tax rate (%) ___ 15 ___ 40 
Tax on withdrawal 0 476 0 1269 
Net withdrawal 2280 2696 1212 1903 
Gain over regular account ___ 416 ___ 691 
Percent gain ___ 18 ___ 57 
     
Alternative retirement tax rate (%)                ___ 0 ___ 30 
Tax on withdrawal 0 0 0 952 
Net withdrawal 2280 3172 1212 2221 
Gain over regular account ___ 892 ___ 1008 
Percent gain ___ 39 ___ 83 
Sources: CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TAX POLICY FOR PENSIONS AND OTHER 
RETIREMENT SAVING 4 tbl.1 (1987), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/ 
default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/50xx/doc5011/doc05-entire.pdf; JOHN H. LANGBEIN, 
SUSAN J. STABILE & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 
336 (4th ed. 2006). 
 
to each worker’s account each year and credit the account with 5% interest on the balance 
in the account. Under such a plan, a worker who earned $50,000 in a given year would get 
an annual cash balance credit of $5000 ($5000 = 10% × $50,000), plus an interest credit 
equal to 5% of the balance in her hypothetical account as of the beginning of the year. Id. 
at 386. 
 44 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TAX POLICY FOR PENSIONS AND OTHER RETIREMENT 
SAVING 4 tbl.1 (1987), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/ 
50xx/doc5011/doc05-entire.pdf; JOHN H. LANGBEIN, SUSAN J. STABILE & BRUCE A. WOLK, 
PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 336 (4th ed. 2006). 
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Consider Example 2 in Table 1. The example assumes that 
the employee is a high-income individual in the 40% income tax 
bracket when working and when retired. If the $1000 is paid 
directly to the employee, the employee would immediately pay 
$400 in tax and deposit $600 after tax into the savings account. 
That $600 savings account would earn 8% interest, but the 
after-tax rate of return would be just 4.8%. The $600 in the 
account compounded at 4.8% interest over fifteen years would 
yield $1212, which could be withdrawn tax free. 
If the employer had instead contributed that $1000 to a 
regular pension plan, the full $1000 would have compounded at 
the 8% pretax rate and yield $3172 at the end of fifteen years. 
Upon withdrawal, that $3172 would all be taxed at the 
employee’s 40% income tax rate, leaving the employee with 
$1903 after tax. That is a net gain of $691 (57%) over the regular 
savings account. 
The examples in Table 1 show the economic advantages of 
regular pension plans and IRAs over regular savings accounts. 
The tax advantages are greatest for those in the highest tax 
brackets in their working years. There are also even greater 
advantages to deferring income for longer periods. 
Contributions to Roth IRAs and Roth 401(k) plans are made 
after-tax; however, withdrawals are tax free. Accordingly, these 
arrangements offer essentially the same tax economic benefits as 
qualified plans and traditional IRAs. For example, following 
Example 2 in Table 1, assume that an employee in the 40% tax 
bracket paid $400 tax on $1000 of earnings and contributed the 
remaining $600 to a Roth IRA with an 8% tax-free interest rate. 
After fifteen years, that investment would be worth $1903, 
exactly what the employee would have had with the regular 
pension plan. 
D. Current Estimates of the Tax Expenditures Associated with 
Annuities, Pensions, and IRAs 
As more fully discussed in Part III below, the special tax 
rules for annuities, pensions, and IRAs are routinely identified as 
“tax expenditures” in the tax expenditure budgets prepared 
annually by the Office of Management and Budget and by the 
Joint Committee on Taxation.45 Policymakers often use these tax 
expenditure estimates as a rough guide to the cost of these 
 
 45 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 205 
tbl.14-1 (2014); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14. 
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special income tax provisions.46 For example, Table 2 reproduces 
the Office of Management and Budget’s 2015 Federal Budget 
estimates of the revenue losses attributable to the special income 
tax benefits for annuities, pensions, and IRAs.47 All in all, these 
tax expenditures are quite large. In fact, two of these items are 
among the top ten largest tax expenditures each year, and five 
are in the top twenty.48 
TABLE 2. ESTIMATES OF TOTAL INCOME TAX EXPENDITURES FOR 
FISCAL YEARS 2015–2019 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2015–19 
Exclusion of interest on 
insurance & annuities 
23,040  24,690  26,370  28,180  30,090  132,370  
Net exclusion of pension 
contributions & earnings: 
      
   Defined benefit plans 
42,340  44,750  47,270  49,160  51,440  234,960  
   Defined contribution plans 
61,050  77,020  88,740  92,770  94,820  414,400  
   IRAs 
17,480  18,540  19,630  20,650  21,720  98,020  
   Savers tax credit 
1210  1260  1300  1280  1300  6350  
   Self-Employed plans 
25,530  28,100  30,890  33,860  37,150  155,530  
Source: OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 
FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 205 tbl.14-1 (2014). 
II. MANY PROPOSALS WOULD CURTAIL THE FAVORABLE TAX 
TREATMENT FOR ANNUITIES, PENSIONS, AND INDIVIDUAL 
RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS 
This Part summarizes a variety of recent proposals to limit 
the tax benefits associated with annuities and pensions.49 Some 
of these proposals have been around for decades, and some are 
relatively recent. 
 
 46 “Admittedly, however, tax expenditure estimates do not necessarily equal the 
increase in Federal revenues that would result from repealing the special provisions.” 
Jonathan Barry Forman, Comparing Apples and Oranges: Some Thoughts on the Pension 
and Social Security Tax Expenditures, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 297, 308 n.50 (2001). 
 47 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 45, at 
205 tbl.14-1, 206, 208. 
 48 Id. at 216 tbl.14-3. 
 49 See also Tax Reform Options: Promoting Retirement Security: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Finance, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/ 
hearings/hearing/?id=ba387157-5056-a032-5252-c7bf71fc6c90; Jack VanDerhei, Tax 
Reform Options: Promoting Retirement Security, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., Nov. 2011, at 
1, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_11-2011_No364_RetTaxRfm2 
.pdf. 
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A. Include Investment Income from Annuities (and Life 
Insurance) in Taxable Income 
Perhaps the oldest tax reform proposal that still has 
currency is the suggestion that we should include the investment 
income from annuities (and life insurance) in taxable income.50 
Under a comprehensive income tax (i.e., a theoretically pure 
income tax), individuals would pay tax on the sum of the wages, 
interest, dividends, and other forms of economic income that they 
earn.51 As more fully explained below, this proposal would extend 
comprehensive income tax treatment to annuities (and life 
insurance) by taxing the inside buildup in those policies.52 
Portions of the premiums paid for annuities are invested and 
earn interest, dividends, and other types of investment income. 
That investment income—the inside buildup—is generally not 
taxable until the annuitant begins receiving annuity 
distributions. A similar deferral of tax occurs on investments in 
whole-life insurance policies.53 Under a pure income tax, 
investors in these insurance products would be taxed on those 
investment earnings annually, just like investors in bank 
accounts, taxable bonds, and mutual funds. According to the 
Joint Committee on Taxation, including the investment income 
 
 50 See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4664, OPTIONS FOR REDUCING THE 
DEFICIT: 2014 TO 2023, at 126 tbl. (2013), available at www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/ 
cbofiles/attachments/44715-OptionsForReducingDeficit-3.pdf; DAVID F. BRADFORD & THE 
U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 178 (2d ed. 1984). 
 51 The classic economic definition of income (also known as the Haig-Simons 
definition of income) is as follows: 
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of 
rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of 
property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question. In 
other words, it is merely the result obtained by adding consumption during the 
period to “wealth” at the end of the period and then subtracting “wealth” at the 
beginning. The sine qua non of income is gain, as our courts have recognized in 
their more lucid moments—and gain to someone during a specified time 
interval. Moreover, this gain may be measured and defined most easily by 
positing a dual objective or purpose, consumption and accumulation, each of 
which may be estimated in a common unit by appeal to market prices. 
HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A 
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938); Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income—
Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 
1921). See generally BROOKINGS INST., COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION (Joseph A. 
Pechman ed., 1977); BROOKINGS INST., WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR 
EXPENDITURE? 50–51 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1980); Henry Aaron, What Is a 
Comprehensive Tax Base Anyway? 22 NAT’L TAX J. 543 (1969); DAVID F. BRADFORD & THE 
U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, supra note 50. 
 52 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 50. 
 53 Id. A whole-life insurance policy provides life insurance coverage throughout the 
insured’s whole life, as opposed to term-life insurance, which provides coverage for a 
specified period. Id.  
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from annuities and life insurance in taxable income would raise 
$24 billion in Fiscal Year 2015 and $210 billion over ten years.54 
B. Cap the Total Accumulation of Retirement Benefits 
In his 2014 Federal Budget, President Barack Obama 
proposed an overall cap on the total amount that individuals 
could accumulate in their tax-favored retirement plans.55 More 
specifically, once an individual had accumulated enough to 
provide a joint and survivor annuity of $205,000 a year, starting 
at age sixty-two, the proposal would prohibit further 
contributions under such plans. The maximum annuity cap was 
designed to equal the maximum annuity that can be paid by a 
qualified defined benefit plan ($205,000 in 2013 and $210,000 in 
2014),56 and the Treasury estimated that the maximum 
permitted accumulation for an individual in 2013 was around 
$3.4 million.57 
Pertinent here, during the 2012 Presidential race, Governor 
Mitt Romney was reported to have accumulated $87 million in 
his IRA,58 and proposals like this seem to be intended to curtail 
such large accumulations. The Joint Committee on Taxation 
estimates that this Obama Administration proposal would raise 
$210 million in Fiscal Year 2015 and $3.8 billion over ten years.59 
In fact, the Obama Administration’s proposal calls for a 
combined limit on defined benefit plans and individual account 
plans (i.e., defined contribution plans and IRAs). That is, further 
contributions would be limited for participants whose total 
individual account balances plus their defined benefit plans 
would be sufficient to provide the maximum allowable annuity 
(e.g., $210,000 a year for a sixty-two-year-old in 2014). To avoid 
 
 54 Id.; see also supra Table 2 (showing slightly different tax expenditure estimates, 
$23 billion in Fiscal Year 2015 and $132 billion over five years). 
 55 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 1, at 166; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, 113TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF CERTAIN REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN 
THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2014 BUDGET PROPOSAL 144 (Comm. Print 2013), available 
at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4538. “[T]ax-favored 
retirement plans include traditional IRAs (including SEPs and SIMPLE IRAs), Roth 
IRAs, qualified retirement plans [(e.g., I.R.C. § 401(k) plans)], [I.R.C. §] 403(b) plans, and 
governmental [I.R.C. §] 457(b) plans.” Id. 
 56 I.R.C. § 415(b)(1)(A) (2012); I.R.S. News Release IR-2013-86, supra note 27. 
 57 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 1, at 166.  
 58 Tom Hamburger, Mitt Romney Exited Bain Capital with Rare Tax Benefits in 
Retirement, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mitt-
romney-exited-bain-capital-with-rare-tax-benefits-in-retirement/2012/09/02/1bddc8de-ec8 
5-11e1-a80b-9f898562d010_story.html. 
 59 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET 
EFFECTS OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2014 
BUDGET PROPOSAL [1], at 8 (Comm. Print 2013), available at https://www.jct.gov/ 
publications.html?func=startdown&id=4520.  
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the complexity that can result from administering such a 
combined limit on individuals who participate in both defined 
benefit and individual account plans,60 John Turner and his 
colleagues have suggested that it would be simpler to have a 
separate $5 million cap just for individual account plans.61 
Turner and his colleagues further recommend that individuals 
with balances in excess of that $5 million cap should be required 
to take taxable distributions from their plans equal to the excess 
over that $5 million cap.62 
C. Cap Contributions at the Lesser of 20% of Compensation or 
$20,000 
In 2010, the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility 
and Reform (co-chaired by Erskine Bowles and Senator Alan 
Simpson) suggested an annual cap on retirement contributions.63 
The proposal would cap the total employer and employee 
retirement plan contributions at the lesser of 20% of the 
employee’s compensation or $20,000.64 This so-called “20/20” 
proposal, which would limit the ability of high-income individuals 
to use retirement tax expenditures, was offered as a part of the 
Commission’s larger plan to raise revenue in order to cut deficits 
and reduce marginal tax rates. 
Needless to say, the 20/20 proposal has had plenty of 
critics.65 Critics are particularly concerned that capping 
contributions would limit the incentives that business owners 
 
 60 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 99-44 (1999), available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-99-
44.pdf; ANN TRICHILO & MARTY PIPPINS, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CHAPTER 8B—ISSUES 
RELATED TO THE REPEAL OF IRC SECTION 415(e) (2002), available at http://www. 
irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/epch8b02.pdf (discussing the repeal of former I.R.C. section 415(e), 
which had provided complicated limits on individuals who participated in both defined 
benefit and defined contribution plans); Louis T. Mazawey, Practical Ways to Deal with 
the Repeal of Section 415(e), 16 PRAC. TAX LAW. 41 (2001), available at http://files. 
ali-cle.org/thumbs/datastorage/lacidoirep/articles/PTL_MAZAWEY-01-924_thumb.pdf. 
 61 See, e.g., John A. Turner, David D. McCarthy & Norman P. Stein, Defined 
Contribution Plans with Very Large Individual Account Balances, 1 J. RETIREMENT 113, 
120 (2014). 
 62 Id.; see also Brendan McFarland & Sylvester J. Schieber, Proposed Lifetime 
Pension Limits: Less than Meets the Eye, TOWERS WATSON (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://www.towerswatson.com/en/Insights/Newsletters/Americas/Insider/2014/proposed-li 
fetime-pension-limits-less-than-meets-the-eye. 
 63 NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY & REFORM, supra note 3.  
 64 Id.; see also Jack VanDerhei, Capping Tax-Preferred Retirement Contributions: 
Preliminary Evidence of the Impact of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility 
and Reform Recommendations, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., July 2011, at 2, available at 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_07_July-11.TaxCap_UnionHI.pdf. 
 65 See, e.g., AM. BENEFITS COUNCIL, “20/20” CAP ON RETIREMENT SAVINGS WOULD 
UNDERMINE RETIREMENT SECURITY (2012), available at http://www.americanbenefits 
council.org/documents2012/401k-limits_2020-talkingpoints110612.pdf. 
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and managers would have to offer retirement plans that today 
cover so many rank-and-file workers. 
Along the same lines, the Congressional Budget Office 
recently outlined a proposal to reduce the current limits on 
annual contributions to retirement plans.66 Under the proposal, 
the maximum individual contribution would be limited to 
$15,500 per year for 401(k)-type plans and $5000 per year for 
IRAs; and the proposal would also limit the total of employee and 
employer contributions to defined contribution plans to $46,000.67 
This proposal would raise $6.7 billion in Fiscal Year 2015 and 
around $89 billion over ten years.68  
D. Move Towards (or Away from) the Roth Model 
A number of reform proposals have called for the pension 
system to move either towards or away from the Roth model. 
Recall that with a traditional IRA, individuals can deduct their 
contributions, but distributions are taxable; on the other hand, 
with a Roth IRA, contributions are not deductible, but 
distributions are tax-free.69 If the tax rate is the same at both 
times, these two tax benefits are equivalent. In the real world, 
however, tax rates are not the same at both times, and critics of 
the Roth approach generally note that giving taxpayers a choice 
almost certainly means that the Treasury will lose revenue as 
taxpayers choose which approach is best for them. On the other 
hand, supporters of the Roth approach often see Roths as a way 
of encouraging low-income workers to save for retirement. 
Allowing individuals to convert their traditional IRAs into Roth 
IRAs by recognizing income now has also been a way to raise 
revenue during the near-term five- and ten-year budget windows 
that Congress uses to reach its revenue targets.70 
House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp’s 
recent tax reform proposals come down in favor of Roths, 
apparently as a way of raising revenue in order to lower 
 
 66 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 50, at 133–34. 
 67 Id. Under current law, the total of employer and employee contributions to a 
defined contribution plan cannot exceed $52,000 in 2014. I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)(A) (2012); 
I.R.S. News Release IR-2013-86 , supra note 27. 
 68 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 50, at 133–34. 
 69 See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. 
 70 See, e.g., Richard Rubin & Margaret Collins, Tax Break for Roth IRA Conversion 
Attracted 10% of High Earners, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 4, 2014), http://www.bus 
inessweek.com/news/2014-01-04/tax-break-for-roth-ira-conversion-attracted-10-percent-of-
high-earners; Deborah L. Jacobs, Why--and How--Congress Should Curb Roth IRAs, 
FORBES (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2012/03/ 26/why-and-
how-congress-should-curb-roth-iras; Leonard E. Burman, Roth Conversions as Revenue 
Raisers: Smoke and Mirrors, 111 TAX NOTES 953 (2006). 
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marginal tax rates. Under one of his tax reform proposals, “the 
income eligibility limits for contributing to Roth IRAs would be 
eliminated”; at the same time, however, “new contributions to 
traditional IRAs” would be prohibited.71 The proposal would 
increase revenues by $14.8 billion over the next ten years.72 
Similarly, under another provision, employees would generally be 
able to contribute no more than half of the maximum elective 
deferral amount ($8750 = 1/2 of $17,500 in 2014) into a 
traditional 401(k) plan; anything more would have to go into a 
Roth 401(k); and this proposal would raise $143.7 billion over the 
next ten years.73 
President Barack Obama recently proposed that the 
government offer no-fee starter retirement savings accounts 
known as “myRAs” (short for “My Retirement Accounts”) that 
would be taxed like Roth IRAs: earnings generally could be 
withdrawn tax free after age fifty-nine-and-a-half.74 Participants 
in these new accounts would earn interest at the same variable 
interest rate as the federal employees’ Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) 
Government Securities Investment Fund.75 
President George W. Bush also favored Roth-style retirement 
accounts. From 2004 through 2009, his Federal Budgets 
recommended consolidating traditional and Roth IRAs into 
so-called Retirement Savings Accounts (RSAs) that would be 
taxed liked Roth IRAs.76 
On the other hand, President Obama’s 2015 Budget would 
limit the tax deferral benefits of Roth plans by requiring them to 
follow the same required minimum distribution (RMD) rules that 
apply to other retirement accounts.77 That is, like qualified plans 
and regular IRAs, individuals would generally have to begin 
taking RMDs from when they reach age seventy-and-a-half.78 
 
 71 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 113TH CONG., TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014 
DISCUSSION DRAFT SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY 36 (2014), available at http://ways 
andmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ways_and_means_section_by_section_sumary_final_02
2614.pdf. 
 72 Id. at 37. 
 73 Id. at 39–40.  
 74 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, MYRA: A SIMPLE, SAFE, AFFORDABLE 
RETIREMENT SAVINGS ACCOUNT (2014), available at http://www.treasurydirect.gov/ready 
savegrow/start_saving/retirementaccountfactsheetenglish.pdf. 
 75 Id. 
 76 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 16 at 59. 
 77 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 26–27 (2014), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2015/assets/budget.pdf.  
 78 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S 
FISCAL YEAR 2015 REVENUE PROPOSALS 251–52 (2014), available at http://www.treasury. 
gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2015.pdf. 
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The proposal would raise $484 million over ten years.79 This 
change could make Roth accounts and Roth conversions much 
less attractive.80 
E. Replace the Current Exclusion with a Refundable Tax Credit 
Over the years, there have been a number of proposals to 
replace the current exclusions (and deductions) for retirement 
savings with tax credits. For example, in 2011, William Gale of 
the Brookings Institution suggested that we replace the current 
system of exclusions and deductions with a flat-rate refundable 
tax credit, given to the employee, with that credit being directly 
deposited in the employee’s retirement account.81 For example, 
instead of allowing an employee to exclude or deduct her 
retirement contributions, a 30% credit would be deposited into 
her individual account. The Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center 
estimates that this proposal would be revenue-neutral over ten 
years: it would take tax benefits from high-income households 
and increase benefits for low- and moderate-income households.82 
Along these lines, over the years, there have been a variety 
of proposals to limit the value of certain tax expenditures. For 
example, the tax system could limit the value of itemized 
deductions and exclusions to, say, 28% of their total value.83 
Then, taxpayers in income tax brackets with statutory rates 
above 28% would receive less benefit from itemized deductions 
and exclusions than under current law, while taxpayers in lower 
tax brackets would be unaffected by the change. This type of 28% 
limit could be applied to the exclusion for 401(k)-type 
contributions and to the deduction for IRA contributions. 
 
 79 Id. at 284. 
 80 See Jeffrey Levine, Required Minimum Distributions for Roth IRAs?, FIN. PLAN. 
(Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.financial-planning.com/blogs/required-minimum-distributions-
for-roth-2688468-1.html. 
 81 WILLIAM G. GALE, TAX REFORM OPTIONS: PROMOTING RETIREMENT SECURITY 5 
(2011), available at http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony%20of%20William 
%20Gale.pdf (testimony submitted to the United States Senate Committee on Finance). 
 82 Id. at 6. 
 83 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 78, at 154–55; CONG. BUDGET 
OFFICE, supra note 50, at 121. Similarly, President George Bush’s recent Advisory Panel 
on Federal Tax Reform recommended replacing most itemized deductions with a 15% tax 
credit. THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND 
PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM 102 (2005), available at 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/upload/Tax-Panel-2.pdf. 
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III. PROPOSALS TO IMPOSE TOUGH LIMITS ON THE TAX BENEFITS 
FOR ANNUITIES, PENSIONS, AND IRAS WOULD RAISE REVENUE 
THAT COULD BE USED TO SUBSIDIZE LOW- AND 
MODERATE-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 
Advocates of imposing tougher limits on the tax benefits for 
annuities, pensions, and IRAs tend to be interested in raising 
revenue for deficit reduction, for cuts in marginal tax rates, or for 
subsidies for low- and moderate-income households. This Part 
discusses some of the underlying issues. 
A. The Favorable Tax Rules for Annuities, Pensions, and IRAs 
Are Costly 
As already mentioned, under a theoretically pure income tax, 
individuals would pay tax annually on all of their investment 
income.84 Of course, the federal income tax deviates from that 
comprehensive income tax ideal in a number of ways. In fact, the 
current federal tax system is really a hybrid income-consumption 
tax system in which some investments are taxed on the income 
tax model and others are taxed under the consumption tax model 
(i.e., as taxpayers spend their money).85 Pertinent here, for 
example, the current taxation of pensions deviates from the 
income tax ideal in that employer contributions are typically 
excluded from gross income, and pension fund earnings are 
exempt from tax.  
In that regard, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Act of 1974 requires the federal government to keep track of the 
revenue “lost” as a result of deviations from an ideal income tax 
through so-called tax expenditure budgets.86 More specifically, 
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 defines 
“tax expenditures” as: “those revenue losses attributable to 
provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special 
exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which 
provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of 
tax liability . . . .”87 
 
 84 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 85 UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX 1 
(Henry J. Aaron, Harvey Galper, & Joseph A. Pechman eds., 1988); Edward J. McCaffery, 
Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1145, 1152 (1992). 
In general, wages, interest, dividends, and other forms of income are taxed when received, 
regardless of whether or not saved. On the other hand, pension benefits are taxed under 
the consumption tax model. 
 86 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 101(c), 
§ 102(a), 88 Stat. 297, 300. 
 87 Id. § 3(a)(3), 88 Stat. at 299 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (2012)). For a historical 
analysis, see Jonathan B. Forman, Origins of the Tax Expenditure Budget, 30 TAX NOTES 
537, 537–45 (1986). 
Do Not Delete 10/13/2014 4:23 PM 
238 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:1 
Thus, the definition of a tax expenditure draws a distinction 
between the ideal provisions of an income tax and the special or 
preferential provisions that are exceptions to that ideal 
structure. For example, according to the Joint Committee on 
Taxation: 
[T]he normal structure of the individual income tax includes the 
following major components: one personal exemption for each 
taxpayer and one for each dependent, the standard deduction, the 
existing tax rate schedule, and deductions for investment and 
employee business expenses. Most other tax benefits to individual 
taxpayers are classified as exceptions to normal income tax law.88 
As we have seen, these exceptions from an ideal income tax 
are routinely identified as tax expenditures by the Office of 
Management and Budget and the Joint Committee on Taxation.89 
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 does not, however, 
actually specify the ideal structure of a tax law, so deciding 
which provisions are special or preferential is necessarily a 
matter of judgment, over which there is often much debate.90 
Pertinent here, many tax experts would prefer if tax 
expenditure estimates were based on a consumption tax ideal 
rather than an income tax ideal.91 Under a consumption tax, 
savings are not supposed to be taxed until they are spent (i.e., 
consumed). Consequently, using a consumption tax ideal would 
lead to a quite different set of tax expenditure estimates. Indeed, 
the tax expenditure associated with pensions would be zero (or, 
to the extent of any “over-taxation” of pensions, negative).92 
 
 88 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 3. 
 89 See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra 
note 45, at 203, 205 tbl.14-1; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 
2. 
 90 See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal “Tax Subsidies” in the National 
Budget, 22 NAT’L TAX J. 244, 245 (1969); Stanley S. Surrey & William F. Hellmuth, The 
Tax Expenditure Budget—Response to Professor Bittker, 22 NAT’L TAX J. 528, 530 (1969); 
Boris I. Bittker, The Tax Expenditure Budget—A Reply to Professors Surrey and 
Hellmuth, 22 NAT’L TAX J. 538, 538 (1969). 
 91 See Jonathan B. Forman The Impact of Shifting to a Personal Consumption Tax 
on Pension Plans and Their Beneficiaries, in TAX REFORM: IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC 
SECURITY AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 51, 56–57 (Dallas L. Salisbury ed., Employee Benefit 
Research Institute 1997); see also PETER BRADY, INV. CO. INST., THE TAX BENEFITS AND 
REVENUE COSTS OF TAX DEFERRAL 6 (2012), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/ 
ppr_12_tax_benefits.pdf (suggesting that current tax expenditure budgets vastly 
overstate the tax costs of retirement savings). 
 92 See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 
2004 app. at 140 tbl.2 (2003), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2004-
PER/pdf/BUDGET-2004-PER.pdf. Pertinent here, see Edward A. Zelinsky, The Tax 
Treatment of Qualified Plans: A Classic Defense of the Status Quo, 66 N.C. L. REV. 315, 
315 (1988); Norman P. Stein, Qualified Plans and Tax Expenditures: A Reply to Professor 
Zelinsky, 9 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 225, 239 (1991); Edward A. Zelinsky, Qualified Plans and 
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Certainly, the government has the power to eliminate or 
curtail the tax benefits for annuities, pensions, and IRAs; but 
should it? As we have seen, there are already a number of limits 
on contributions and benefits (e.g., the $17,500 annual cap on 
401(k)-type contributions). The question is really whether it 
makes sense to toughen the current limits and/or impose new 
limits on deferred savings. Proponents of comprehensive income 
taxation tend to favor such tougher caps, while proponents of 
consumption taxation tend to oppose tougher caps. 
To be sure, a good deal of revenue could be raised from 
curtailing the current tax benefits for annuities, pensions, and 
IRAs. And certainly that revenue could be used for deficit 
reduction, for cuts in marginal tax rates, or for additional 
retirement savings subsidies for low- and moderate-income 
households. Those are all worthwhile uses for additional revenue, 
but if raising revenue is the goal, it is not clear that curtailing 
the tax benefits for savings is the best way to raise revenue. 
While the retirement savings tax benefits are among the largest 
tax expenditures in the tax expenditure budget,93 curtailing them 
might undermine our already fragile retirement system. 
Historically, Congress has often let revenue needs drive 
pension policy.94 Instead, it should be driven by genuine concerns 
about how to ensure that our pension system will provide 
adequate retirement incomes for all American workers.95 
B. The Favorable Tax Rules for Annuities, Pensions, and IRAs 
Could Be Better Targeted to Help Low- and Moderate-Income 
Households  
Many proponents of curtailing the tax benefits for annuities, 
pensions, and IRAs believe that those benefits could be better 
targeted to help low- and moderate-income households.96 In that 
regard, there is no question that these tax expenditures are 
 
Identifying Tax Expenditures: A Rejoinder to Professor Stein, 9 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 257, 257 
(1991). 
 93 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 94 See, e.g., David A. Pratt, Pension Simplification, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 565, 566 
(2002). 
 95 See, e.g., G.A. (Sandy) Mackenzie & Jonathan Barry Forman, Reforming the 
Second Tier of the U.S. Pension System: Tabula Rasa or Step by Step?, 46 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 631, 633 (2013). 
 96 See, e.g., Turner, McCarthy & Stein, supra note 61; GALE, supra note 81; Chuck 
Marr, Nathaniel Frentz & Chye-Ching Huang, Retirement Tax Incentives Are Ripe for 
Reform: Current Incentives Are Expensive, Inefficient, and Inequitable, CENTER ON 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm 
?fa=view&id=4063; TERESA GHILARDUCCI, WHEN I’M SIXTY-FOUR: THE PLOT AGAINST 
PENSIONS AND THE PLAN TO SAVE THEM 54–57 (2008). 
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skewed in favor of high-income households. For example, Table 3 
shows that the top quintile of households receive roughly 
two-thirds of the tax benefits from the exclusion of pension 
contributions and earnings.97 Meanwhile, the bottom quintiles 
get hardly any tax benefits.  
TABLE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF THE EXCLUSION OF NET 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND EARNINGS, BY INCOME GROUP, 2013 
 Lowest 
quintile 
Second 
quintile 
Middle 
quintile 
Fourth 
quintile 
Highest 
quintile 
All 
quintiles 
Share 2 5 9 18 66 100 
Share of after-tax  
income                            0.4 0.7 0.8 1.2 2.0 1.4 
Source: CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4308, THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR 
TAX EXPENDITURES IN THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM 15 tbl. 2 (2013), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43768_ 
DistributionTaxExpenditures.pdf. 
Accordingly, curtailing the tax benefits for retirement 
contributions and/or benefits likely would reduce the proportion 
of tax expenditures that goes to high-income households and 
increase the relative proportion that goes to low- and 
moderate-income households. Alternatively, replacing the 
current system of exclusions and deductions with refundable tax 
credits could also improve the distribution of benefits. However, 
to the extent that these changes would limit the incentives that 
business owners and managers have to offer retirement plans, 
overall coverage might decline. All in all there are tradeoffs, and 
the focus should be on designing a low-cost pension system that 
will provide adequate retirement incomes for all American 
workers.98 
C. The Current System Is Already Too Complicated and Needs 
to Be Simplified 
One of the major problems with the current retirement 
savings system is its incredible complexity. In addition to the 
wide variety of annuity options, there are a plethora of 
 
 97 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4308, THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR TAX 
EXPENDITURES IN THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM 15 tbl.2 (2013), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43768_DistributionTaxExpendi
tures.pdf; see also Distribution of Tax Expenditures for Housing, Health and Retirement 
Savings, TAX POL’Y CENTER, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/Tax_Expendit  
ures_tables.cfm (last visited Feb. 20, 2014); T13-0295 Tax Benefit of Certain Retirement 
Savings Incentives (Cash-flow Approach), TAX POL’Y CENTER (Dec. 18, 2013), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/ numbers/displayatab.cfm?DocID=4041. 
 98 See, e.g., Forman & Mackenzie, supra note 15, at 6-43. 
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retirement plans including traditional defined benefit plans, cash 
balance plans, money purchase pension plans, target benefit 
plans, profit-sharing plans, stock bonus plans, employee stock 
ownership plans (ESOPs), SIMPLE plans, SEPs, IRAs, and Roth 
IRAs. Every one of these plans has a different set of rules and 
regulations, limits on contributions, vesting rules, and tax 
advantages. The net result is bewildering complexity for 
everyone. As a result, many analysts have called for 
simplification.99 
Pertinent here, we already have numerous limits on 
retirement contributions and benefits, and extensive regulations 
that govern annuities, pensions, and IRAs. As Congress thinks 
about adding new limits and toughening existing ones, one hopes 
that it also takes the opportunity to reform and simplify the 
current system. 
CONCLUSION 
In recent years, there have been a number of proposals to 
curtail the favorable tax treatment that is currently available for 
annuities, pensions, and IRAs. Advocates of imposing tougher 
limits on the tax benefits for annuities, pensions, and IRAs tend 
to be interested in raising revenue for deficit reduction, for cuts 
in marginal tax rates, or for subsidies for low- and 
moderate-income households. These are worthy goals; however, 
as Congress thinks about limiting the tax incentives for 
annuities, pensions, and IRAs, it needs to be careful not to 
undermine our already fragile retirement system. 
 
 
 99 See, e.g., Pratt, supra note 94; Forman & Mackenzie, supra note 15; David A. 
Pratt, Focus on . . . Pension Simplification, 9 J. PENSION BENEFITS 8 (2002); Pamela 
Perun & C. Eugene Steuerle, Reality Testing for Pension Reform 2 (May 6, 2003) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410797_ 
reality_testing_pension_reform.pdf. 
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